 State Civil Commitment Center:
Department of Human Services DHS-TDF,
1680 E County Farm Rd,
Rushville, IL 62681
Contact:
Run By: Liberty Healthcare Corp
Commitment Laws:
(725 ILCS 207/) Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act.
Other relevant information:
Very good overview of Illinois law.
IDOC has the responsibility per 725 ILCS 207 to review certain offenders for civil commitment as a sexually violent persons. The Sex Offender Services Unit ensures that all evaluations are completed and the staff serve as liaison to the Attorney General’s Office and State’s Attorney’s Offices regarding this process.
The Sex Offender Services Unit serves as administrator for the Sexually Dangerous Persons Civil Commitment Program at Big Muddy River Correctional Center and liaisons with the court systems.
Background on Rushville Facility and Who Runs it
Treatment And Detention Facility (TDF): The Treatment and Detention Facility (TDF) was established in response to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, Public Act 90 40, which was signed into law by Governor Jim Edgar on June 30, 1997, and became effective January 1, 1998. The purpose of the TDF is to help protect the survivors of sexual violence, the general public, and the program staff members, by treating and managing sexually violent persons who are detained or committed under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act in a safe and secure detention and treatment facility, and by supporting intensive and specialized community supervision as ordered by the Circuit Court in the State of Illinois.
The Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act provides for the detention and treatment of certain sex offenders who (1) have been convicted, adjudicated delinquent, or found not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexual offense; and (2) remain dangerous due to a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that they will engage in acts of sexual violence. The qualifying offenses under the Act include the following: criminal sexual assault; aggravated criminal sexual assault; predatory criminal sexual assault of a child; aggravated criminal sexual abuse; sexually motivated first degree murder; or solicitation, conspiracy, or attempt to commit any of the aforementioned crimes.
Under the Act, IDHS must provide ''control, care, and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually dangerous person.'' In accordance with this legislative mandate the IDHS has the responsibility to: manage a safe and secure environment for the protection of program staff and visitors, court ordered detainees, and civilly committed sexually violent persons, as well as state and personal property; ensure the provision of humane care and treatment in the management of court ordered detainees and sexually violent persons; provide assistance to the courts through the provision of comprehensive sex offender specific evaluation and treatment; offer individualized treatment and risk management services to detainees and sexually violent persons to promote healthy, prosocial, and law abiding behavior and individual accountability; utilize treatment approaches that enable sex offenders to understand and take responsibility for their behavior, increase motivation to change their harmful behavior, and learn the skills necessary to change those behaviors; implement policies and practices that are sensitive to the needs and safety of victims and their families and ensure timely notification to victims of sexually violent offenders of their conditional release or discharge; evaluate the effectiveness of specialized sex offender treatment and risk management methods; and manage an organizational environment, which fosters teamwork, provides education and training, ensures excellence from all staff, and provides resources and policy guidance to accomplish our purpose.
The TDF has been located in Rushville since August 2006, and is projected to have 360 residents by the end of SFY 09.
From Illinois Legal Advocate:Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Persons in Illinois
A person who is deemed to have a mental disorder that makes it substantially likely that he will commit further acts of sexual violence may be civilly committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services. The Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act ("SVPCA"), 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. sets forth the civil commitment procedure.
The SVPCA applies to "sexually violent persons," that is, persons who have been convicted, or found not guilty by reason of insanity, of a sexually violent offense. The SVPCA requires that the agency having custody of a such a person (typically the Department of Corrections) must notify the Attorney General and the State's Attorney for the county in which the person was convicted within 90 days of the person's release. The Attorney General or State's Attorney may then petition the court for an order declaring the person to be civilly committed under the Act. If the court or a jury finds the respondent to be a sexually violent person, the court will order him committed to the care of the Department of Human Services "for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually violent person." 725 ILCS 207/40. Periodic re-examination is required within six months after the initial commitment, and once per year thereafter.
If the committed person constitutes a danger, the SVPCA directs that he be held in a secure facility. The Illinois Department of Human Services contracts with the Department of Corrections to provide the secure facility. Currently, the facility used to house SVPs is at the Joliet Annex, Joliet, Illinois.
The SVPCA became effective in 1998, so the case law with respect to this class of persons is as yet undeveloped. Challenges to the constitutionality of the Act will almost certainly fail since the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld laws similar to the SVPCA. See Selling v. Young, 121 S. Ct. 727 (2001); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). To date, persons committed under the Act have challenged conditions of confinement and inadequate therapeutic treatment, as well as alleged due process and equal protection violations stemming from their classification as sexually violent persons.
Note the distinctions between the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act and the Sexually Dangerous Person Act ("SDPA"), 725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. The latter statute applies to a much larger group of offenders (725 ILCS 205/1.01 and 725 ILCS 207/5(f)). A person may be committed pursuant to the SDPA as an alternative to criminal prosecution, whereas a person deemed to be sexually violent under the SVPCA is generally committed following a criminal proceeding. The state is obligated to provide care and treatment to both groups of persons. Sexually violent persons, however, fall under the supervision of the Department of Corrections, whereas sexually dangerous persons fall under the care of the Department of Human Services. For a discussion of the difference between the two Acts, see People v. McVeay, 302 Ill. App.3d 960, 706 N.E.2d 539 (Ill. App. 1999) and People v. McDougle, 3030 Ill.App.3d 509, 708 N.E.2d 482 (Ill. App. 1999).
Decisions
- Rogers v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrections, 2001 WL 914490 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2001): Plaintiffs alleged that IDOC's Special Evaluations Unit, which has authority to petition for postsentence confinement under the SVPCA, selectively recommended African-American offenders who committed crimes against Caucasian victims. The court held that under the rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), plaintiffs could not bring Section 1983 action since, if successful, the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the confinement. Plaintiffs must first petition for habeas corpus relief. As for those plaintiffs who were released, however, since they have no remedy under Section 2255, they may sue for damages.
- Tineybey et al. v. Peters, 2001 WL 527409 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2001): Plaintiff's claim that therapeutic program for sex offenders was patently ineffective medical treatment could not survive a motion to dismiss. Claims for constitutionally ineffective medical treatment require an objectively serious medical condition and an act of deliberate indifference by defendants, neither of which were alleged here. In addition, having to shower in the company of homosexuals did not rise to the sort of sexual harassment or abuse prescribed by the Eighth Amendment.
- Kilbury v. Budz, 2001 WL 845471 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2001): Plaintiff alleged that former security therapist sexually harassed him. No constitutional tort existed where sexual acts were admittedly consensual and plaintiff suffered no injury.
- Tineybey v. Peters, 2000 WL 705983 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 2000): Plaintiffs alleged denial of access to law library. The court held that a prison policy permitting sexually violent persons different hours of access to library facilities was related to a legitimate purpose. Certain sexually violent persons may be at risk of harm at the hands of the general population; their presence could be disruptive. These are sufficient reasons to justify disparate treatment.
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